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SIX KLIMTS, A PICASSO, & A SCHIELE:
RECENT LITIGATION ATTEMPTS TO
RECOVER NAZI STOLEN ART
David Wissbroecker*
1. INTRODUCTION
Conquering armies since the dawn of civilization have viewed
the cultural treasures of a conquered people as the spoils of war,
rightfully theirs for the taking as payment for their efforts in battle.
Such was the view, at least, until the outset of the 20th century
when civilized nations formed agreements to eliminate the
barbaric practice. But enlightened views and international
compacts did not prevent the systematic spoliation of cultural
treasures by the Nazis during World War II, and sixty-five years
later Europe is still trying to sort out who took what from whom,
as the rightful owners of plundered artworks emerge to claim the
treasures that disappeared from family.
This article attempts to trace the recent efforts of some of those
individuals whose families lost priceless treasures to Nazi
collectors during World War II. Section II gives a brief overview
of how and why the Nazis embarked on their artistic feeding
frenzy. Section III looks at how looted works of art escaped
efforts to return them to their rightful owners after the war and
instead ended up in museums or private collections. Sections IV,
V, and VI detail the efforts of Lea Bondi Jaray, Maria Altmann,
and Thomas Bennigson to recover, through litigation, works of art
that formerly belonged to their families in Europe before they were
stolen by the Nazis. Finally, Section VII offers a brief summary
and a concluding note on the problems inherent in conducting
litigation centered on events that happened nearly 70 years ago.
* David Wissbroecker is a staff attorney with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, and currently works as a judicial clerk in the chambers
of Judge John L. Coffey. Wissbroecker received his J.D. magna cum laude
from the University of Illinois in 2003, and B.A. in Art History and History
from Arizona State University in 1998.
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The article also includes glimpses throughout the text into similar
cases that did not reach the litigation stage, and discusses efforts
by nations and museums to resolve these disputes without
litigation.
II. ACCUMULATING THE NAZI HOARD
Between the years 1938 to 1945, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi
troops looted and confiscated thousands of works of art throughout
occupied Europe.' Although an exact number is impossible to
pinpoint, between one-fourth and one-third of Europe's artistic
treasure trove was pillaged by the Nazis in an effort to realize
Hitler's vision for Germany as the cultural center of Europe?
Hitler was not seeking out just any works of art; in his view only
German or Germanic art was worthy of Third Reich edification.3
But Hitler and the Nazis still had a use for works that they did not
consider cultural property of the Third Reich;4 the Nazis also
1. Emily J. Henson, The Last Prisoners of War: Returning World War II Art
To Its Rightful Owners - Can Moral Obligations Be Translated Into Legal
Duties?, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 1103, 1103 (2002).
2. Id. at 1105 (the number of all valuables looted during the war, including
all art objects, books, Judaica, silver pieces and other valuables has been
estimated at $10.7 million). See also Tom Tugend, Lawyer Fights for Nazi-
looted Art Works, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 9, 2003.
3. Henson, supra note 1, at 1106 (the Nazis sought any type of German or
Germanic art, even if the German artworks were in bad condition or
anonymous); Stephen J. Schlegelmilch, Ghosts of the Holocaust: Holocaust
Victim Fine Arts Litigation and a Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 87, 93 (1999) (such painters as Vermeer, Pieter
Bruegel the Elder, Rembrandt, Hals, Fragonard, Van Eyck, and Durer were
particularly targeted because, pursuant to Nazi aesthetic ideology, they
represented pure Northern European art of the highest order).
4. Kelly Diane Walton, Leave No Stone Unturned: The Search For Art
Stolen By The Nazis and The Legal Rules Governing Restitution of Stolen Art, 9
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 549, 556 (1999) (Josef Goebbels
and the Einsensatzstab Reichleiter Rosenberg were in charge of repatriating art
from the conquered Western nations, and part of the plan was to seize works
taken by the French in the Napoleonic Wars, as well as to seize and secure art of
Germanic origin and character).
[Vol. XIV: 39
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looted the so-called 'degenerate art' of the modem masters5 and
used these artworks as a sort of war currency to trade for Germanic
art.6
The Nazis confiscated and resold or traded numerous works of
art located in Germany, both before and after the Nazis began
deporting Jews to concentration camps in the east.7 Among these
works were those displayed in the infamous "Entartete Kunst," or
"Degenerate Art" exhibit first shown in Munich in 1937.' These
works were later sold to collectors and dealers,9 as were pieces of
'degenerate art' confiscated from Jewish homes by the Gestapo
after 1938.1" When the Nazis turned their attention towards art
5. Henson, supra note 1, at 1105 (Degenerate art was unacceptable art and
included modem or abstract works, art by Jewish artists or depicting Jewish
subjects, and anything that was critical of Germany or did not depict Germany
as the Nazis perceived it); Schlegelmilch, supra note 3, at 94 ("Hitler...
attacked Futurism, Dadaism, and Cubism in his 'Mein Kampf' and, after his rise
to power, continued to purge the German people from the influence of [the]
spiritual madness.... of such Judeo Bolshevist modem artists as Pissaro,
Kandinsky, Marc, Chagall, Klee, Matisse, Dix, Ensor, Picasso, and Van Gogh").
6. Henson, supra note 1, at 1106; Schlegelmilch, supra note 3, at 94 (some
pieces of German heritage could not be plundered, often because they were in
the United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet Union or another not-yet-
annexed Westem European nation, and therefore had to be purchased. The
currency by which these purchases were financed often came from the sale or
exchange of seized 'degenerate art').
7. Matthew Lippman, Art and Ideology in the Third Reich: The Protection of
Cultural Property and the Humanitarian Law of War, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-
14(1998).
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id. at 13-14.
10. Emma Daly, American Says Painting in Spain is Holocaust Loot, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at El (this article discusses a claim by Claude Cassirer, a
United States citizen, for Pissarro's Rue St. - Honore, Apres-Midi, Effet de
Pluie. The Pissarro is currently hanging in the Thyssen-Bomemisza Museum in
Madrid. Cassirer claims that the painting was confiscated from his
grandmother's apartment in Munich in 1939, and later auctioned in 1943. Both
the Museum and Spain have refused to return the painting. The claim is being
pursued by the Commission for Art Recovery. More facts on this dispute are
available in the WHITE PAPER ON THE MADRID THYSSEN MUSEUM'S NAZI-
LOOTED PISSARRO, Sept. 2002, at
2004]
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located in occupied countries, they found the cultural centers of
Vienna and Paris especially fertile looting grounds for 'degenerate
art' because both cities boasted lavish private collections and
housed the galleries of important modem art dealers." It was in
these cities that a Schiele was taken from Lea Bondi Jaray,"2 six
Klimts from Ferdinand Bloch, 3 and a Piccaso from Carlota
Landsburg. 4 The story of how these works of 'degenerate art'
were taken from their rightful owners, how they made their way
into the hands of their current possessors, and the efforts of the
rightful owners' heirs to regain possession of these works of art
demonstrates the complexity of the international legal morass that
surrounds the issue of recovering Nazi-looted art.
III. THE CLIMATE FOR RECOVERY
Some additional background on the issue of Nazi-looted art
should be briefly noted before this story can be accurately related.
The conclusion of World War II brought a halt to Nazi looting, but
the confusion that ensued during the Allied occupation allowed a
large number of confiscated works to elude attempts by their
rightful owners to recover the art. 5 British and American forces
http://www.comartrecovery.org/policies/white-pa.pdf).
11. See HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO
STEAL THE WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (2d ed. 1997); LYNN H.
NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE
THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994). See also Lippman, supra
note 7, at 24 (the main cultural target [in Vienna] was the art. collections of
Vienna's leading Jewish family, the Rothschilds .... The great prizes [in Paris]
were the galleries of the leading Jewish art dealers ... including the
Wildenstein, Seligmann, Paul Rosenberg, and Berheim-Jeune Galleries and the
collection of the Rothschild family).
12. United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6445, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 2002) ("Wally II1").
13. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2002)
("Altmann I').
14. Howard Reich, Looted Picasso at Heart of Legal Battle, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Dec. 25, 2002, at Cl.
15. See, e.g. Schlegelmilch, supra note 3, at 95.
[Vol. XIV: 39
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set up collection points to process and sort out enormous caches of
art discovered in "mines, hidden vaults, monasteries, office
buildings, homes, and even medieval castles."' 6 However, Allied
efforts to make sure the works found their way back to their
rightful owners were largely unsuccessful and complicated by
Allied looting.'7 Many works were misclassified and dumped into
the hands of post-war European governments that were less than
careful in their attempts to find the rightful owners. 8 Still others
never came into Allied hands and found their way out of Europe
and into the United States through clandestine means. 9 And
regrettably, capitalist pursuits eventually overcame conscientious
attempts to control trade in Nazi-looted art,2" and a period of
blissful ignorance ensued.2
16. Id. (the "Monuments, Fine Arts, & Architecture" was set up to "salvage,
catalogue, and repatriate the treasures").
17. Id. See also Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829
(E.D.N.Y. 1981); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(both suits against owners of collections that had purchased art from American
soldiers who had looted art after the war); and Malcolm Balfour, Court OK'S
Holocaust Suit vs. U.S., N.Y. POST, Feb. 28, 2003, at 22 (discussing a pending
lawsuit that alleges the U.S. government confiscated $200 million worth of
valuables, including art works, from the "Gold Train" and never returned the
valuables to their rightful owners. The "Gold Train" was a cache of war's-end
Nazi plunder stolen from Hungarian Jews intercepted en route to Austria by
U.S. forces. The suit alleges that many of the works were auctioned for federal
benefit or used in government offices and officials' homes).
18. See Wally IlL 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *6; Paulina McCarter
Collins, Has "The Lost Museum" Been Found? Declassification of
Government Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets Offer Real
Opportunity to "Do Justice "for Holocaust Victims on the Issue of Nazi-Looted
Art, 54 ME. L. REv. 115, 127 (2002).
19. Collins, supra note 18, at 125 (the U.S. government attempted to monitor
importation of art into the country after the war, but determined dealers found
the means to get works to American museums and collectors "eager to fill the
gaps in their collections with works from Europe").
20. Ron Grossman, Key to Art Nazis Stole May Be Locked Away;
Commission's Plan to Publish Postwar Loss Claims in Peril, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Dec. 17, 2000.
21. See Howard Reich, Whose Picasso Is It?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 19,
2003, at C1.
2004]
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The comfortable complicity of museums and collectors was
dealt a disruptive blow in the mid-1990s, when Hector Feliciano
and Lynn H. Nicholas published books detailing the systematic
method of looting that the Nazis utilized.22 The books detailed not
only the extent of Nazi looting, but also gave potential claimants a
body of research that denoted unequivocal evidence of theft.23 No
longer could dealers and collectors ignore gaps in provenance by
simply pointing to representations made by the previous seller;
both books provided easily verifiable evidence that art had
illegally passed through Nazi hands before finding a willing
purchaser.24 It was against this backdrop that the first significant
claim was made in the United States for recovery of a Nazi-looted
painting.25 The tide has been turning ever since. 6
IV. THE BATTLE FOR WALLY
In 1938, Egon Schiele's Portrait of Wally ("Wally") hung on a
wall in Lea Bondi Jaray's apartment in Vienna, Austria.27 The
painting was taken from Jaray, an Austrian Jew, in 1938 through
the process of "Aryanization," by Frederick Welz 8 After the
22. See FELICIANO, supra note 11.
23. Id.
24. See generally Collins, supra note 18.
25. See HOWARD J. TIERNANS, LANDSCAPE WITH SMOKESTACKS: THE CASE
OF THE ALLEGEDLY PLUNDERED DEGAS (2000) (the heirs of Friedrich Gutmann
demanded the return of Degas' Landscape with Smokestacks from Chicago
collector Daniel Searle in 1995. The dispute was set for trial in federal court in
1998, but was settled on the eve of litigation. The painting was sold to The Art
Institute of Chicago and the Gutmann heirs split the proceeds with Searle).
26. See, e.g., Henson, supra note 1, at 1133-35 (detailing the return of
Picasso's L 'Odalisque to the Rosenberg heirs); Howard N. Spiegler, Recovering
Nazi-Looted Art: Report From the Front Lines, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 297, 297
(2001) (detailing return of a Cranach painting to the heirs of Dr. Phillipe von
Gomperz); Collins, supra note 18, at 117-119 (detailing return of Franz
Snyder's "Still Life With Fruit and Game" to the heirs of Edgar Stem).
27. Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *4.
28. Id. "Aryanization" was the forced sale of Jewish property to "Aryans" at
artificially low prices. Welz was an Austrian who joined the Nazi party after the
German Reich annexed Austria in March of 1938.
[Vol. XIV: 39
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conclusion of World War II, Welz was interned on suspicion of
war crimes, and all property in his possession at the time,
including Wally, was seized by the United States armed forces in
Austria. 29 Under post-war policies and protocols in effect at the
time, Wally was transferred to an Austrian government authority,
the Bundesdenkmalant ("BDA").0  Wally was mistakenly
attributed to the Aryanized Dr. Heinrich Rieger collection, and
subsequently shipped to the Austrian National Gallery ("the
Belvedere") as part of an agreed sale of a portion of the Rieger
collection by the Rieger heirs."
Jaray returned to Vienna after the war and asked Welz about
Wally.3 2 Welz told Jaray that Wally "had been confiscated and was
now at the Belvedere, having erroneously been mixed in with the
Rieger collection."33 Jaray made no attempts to recover Wally at
the time, but in 1953 was contacted by a Schiele collector, Dr.
Rudolph Leopold. 4 Leopold represented to Jaray that he would
help her recover Wally from the Belvedere in return for her
assistance in acquiring other Schiele works.35 Instead Leopold
acquired Wally for himself in 1954.36
Jaray learned of Leopold's actions in 1957 when Leopold listed
himself as the owner of Wally in an exhibition catalogue. 7 Jaray
confronted Leopold at this exhibition and unsuccessfully
demanded the return of Wally.38  Jaray made several other
unsuccessful attempts to secure the return of Wally with the
assistance of Austrian lawyers, but died in 1969 with Wally still in
29. Id. at *4.
30. Id. at *5; Id. at n2 (the BDA "was not charged with the restitution of
artwork to the true owners").
31. Id. at *6-7; Id. at *6 (the United States authorities initially questioned
whether or not Wally was properly included in the Rieger collection based on
records kept by Welz).
32. Wally IIl, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *7.
33. Id.
34. Id. at *8.
35. Id.
36. Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *8.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *9.
2004]
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Leopold's possession.39
In 1994 Leopold sold Wally to an Austrian museum, the
Leopold Museum-Privatstiftung ("the Leopold"), where he is
Museological Director for life. In 1997 the Leopold sent Wally
to New York for display at the Museum of Modem Art
("MoMA"). In 1998 the New York County District Attorney's
office issued a subpoena for Wally, which was later quashed by the
New York Court of Appeals on September 21, 1999. 4' That same
day the United States obtained a seizure warrant under the
National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA") 42 and started a forfeiture
action, claiming that Wally should be forfeited "because the
Leopold transported it in foreign commerce knowing it to have
been stolen or converted property. 43
The court initially dismissed the government's complaint on the
basis that Wally did not fit the definition of "stolen" under the
NSPA because it had been recovered by United States armed
39. Id. at"8-10.
40. Id. at *11.
41. Wally Il, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *11-12. The Court of
Appeals' decision is reported at In the Matter of the Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Served on Museum of Modern Art, 719 N.E.2d 897 (1999). The
subpoena also encompassed Schiele's Dead City III, a painting claimed by the
heirs of Fritz Grunbaum. Id. at 899. The Grunbaum heirs also claimed
ownership of 15 other Schieles shown at the same MoMA exhibit; the paintings
had been purchased by a Swiss art dealer and later conveyed to the Leopold.
Lippman, supra note 7, at 85. The Schieles claimed by the Grunbaum heirs
have since been returned to Austria, including Dead City III. Celestine Bohlen,
Lauder's Mix of Restitution and Collecting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, at El. Other
Schiele paintings claimed by the Grunbaum heirs have been subsequently seized
within Austria by the Austrian government. See infra, note 77. It is unclear
why the United States did not include the Grunbaum Schieles in its seizure
warrant, but it can be speculated that the Grunbaum heirs' title to these paintings
may have been lost under Swiss law, which accords a bona fide purchaser good
title to stolen goods after five years of uninterrupted possession. Kelly Ann
Falconer, When Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a Legally Binding
International Agreement Regarding Ownership of Nazi-Looted Art, 21 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 383, 422 (2000).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
43. Wally 11, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *12.
[Vol. XIV: 39
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forces after the war.4 The court allowed the government to amend
its complaint, and reversed the Wally I holding based on a
clarification of the role of the United States armed forces as one of
"collecting" rather than "recovering" stolen property.45
The Wally III court also addressed and rejected additional
attempts to dismiss the action on jurisdictional grounds, finding
that Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 did not grant
Austria sole responsibility to restore "property improperly seized
from its citizens during Nazi rule,' 46 and that the action was not
44. See United States v. Portrait of Wally, 105 F. Supp. 288, 294 (S.D.N.Y
2000) ("Wally 1"). The court attributed to the United States armed forces the
role of Jaray's agent, meaning that they would have recovered it on her behalf.
Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *45-46. Under the "recovery
doctrine" the painting would no longer be considered stolen as it was recovered
by the owner or her agent acting on her behalf. Id. at *46.
45. See id. at *45-49. The government "retracted the allegation that [it was]
holding stolen works of art with an eye towards their eventual restitution" which
would have created the agency relationship; rather, "the allied forces seized all
of the property of suspected war criminals, regardless of whether it was stolen,
Aryanized, or legitimately acquired." Id. at *47. The court stated that: "Under
these circumstances, it can no longer be said that the United States Military
acted as Bondi's agent when it came into possession of Wally .... [they were
just] required to sort all seized property and transfer it to the BDA. This lack of
knowledge and duty... negates the existence of the requisite agency
relationship." Id. at *47-48. Under a similar rationale, the BDA did not have
the requisite agency relationship to relieve Wally of its stolen taint. Id. at *49-
50.
46. Id. at *19-25. The Leopold and the Republic of Austria, as amicus
curiae, argued that Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, signed by the
United States, granted Austria exclusive jurisdiction to dispose of all
improperly-seized property not claimed within six months after the treaty was
signed. Id. at *21-23. The court cited Altmann II, in stating that "Article 26...
does not state that the Austrian government has exclusive jurisdiction over such
property... [and] [t]he restitution laws enacted to fulfill Austria's obligation
under the treaty have never been viewed as the exclusive means for restoring
property; indeed other restitution actions have been filed in the United States."
Id. at *23-24. Also, "had the Republic of Austria taken control of Wally as
unclaimed property within the meaning of the Treaty, it would have breached
the treaty to allow the painting to remain with the state-owned Belvedere or to
give it to Dr. Leopold." Id. at *24. The court further reasoned that the treaty
could not be read to include Wally, as Wally was only unclaimed because it was
2004]
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barred by the act of state doctrine,47 international comity,48 or the
political question doctrine.49
The court then went on to address the predicate elements
necessary for an NSPA seizure claim,5" first holding that Welz
"stole" Wally under the NSPA 1 The court rejected claims that
either the Belvedere or Leopold acquired good title to Wally
through Austrian law of prescription despite Welz' theft."
improperly included in the Rieger collection. Id. at *25.
47. Id. at *28. Similar to the court's conclusions, there was no act of state
present because "Wally was never legally transferred to the Rieger heirs
pursuant to an official Austrian government determination of
ownership... Rather, the BDA erroneously attributed it to the Rieger collection
and mistakenly shipped it to the Belvedere...".
48. Id. at *33-34. The court found that the balance of interests of the
respective forums and international policy favored the United States because
Jaray's ownership in Wally "was never adjudicated on the merits under Austrian
law," and the United States has a strong interest in prohibiting "knowing
transportation of stolen or converted goods."
49. Id. at *37-38. The court reasoned that there was no impermissible
intrusion on Austrian law; the court's "review of Austrian law is limited to
determining the predicate issue of ownership."
50. Id. at *39. The elements of a violation of the NSPA are "(1) the
transportation in interstate commerce of property, (2) valued at $5,000 or more,
(3) with knowledge that the property was "stolen, converted or taken by fraud";
18 U.S.C. § 2314; Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 214 (1985); and
United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 466 (2d Cir. 1991). The government's
complaint alleged that "the Leopold transported Wally knowing it to have been
stolen by Welz and/or converted by Dr. Leopold."
51. Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *50-52. The court had no
question of Welz' specific criminal intent to steal Wally, even if he may have
been acting under the "colorable" law of Aryanization.
52. Id. at *53-54 n16. Under Austrian Law (Paragraph 1475 of the Austrian
Civil Code), "a possessor of property may acquire title to that property if the
possession is based on legal title (purchase or exchange) and extends throughout
the [three year] statutory period accompanied by the possessor's belief that the
possession is lawful"); Both the Belvedere and Leopold had reason to doubt
legal possession of Wally at all times during their possession of the painting, and
a "possessor will be found not to have had the requisite confidence for
prescription if, at any time during the prescriptive period, the possessor had any
objective reason to doubt his claim ...." Id. at *55. The Belvedere was put on
notice as to the probability that Wally was erroneously attributed to the Rieger
[Vol. XIV: 39
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Additionally, the court rejected a claim that the action was barred
by the statute of limitations,53 and determined that application of
the doctrine of laches was not subject to resolution at this stage in
the proceedings. 4 Returning to necessary NSPA elements,55 the
court found that the Leopold knowingly transported stolen
property when it brought Wally to New York, thus satisfying the
NSPA's scienter requirement. 6  The court then dismissed
collection, and Leopold was informed directly by Jaray of her claim to Wally.
Id. at *55-59 ("That Dr. Leopold may have been able to whistle past the
graveyard with enough confidence to fool even himself is a hypothesis I need
not indulge at this stage of the case."). Therefore, neither entity gained
prescriptive title to Wally. Id. at *52-59.
53. Id. at *61. The court decided that the Austrian statute of limitations was
applicable, and did not begin to run under the. Austrian Civil Code which does
not "generally subject ownership rights to limitation"; Jaray's ownership rights
were not abrogated by the Third Restitution Act of 1947, which would have
sunsetted her rights at one year, because Welz's theft brought Jaray's claim
under the jurisdiction of the Austrian Civil Code, and therefore was not the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Third Restitution Act. The court rejected similar
claims under the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 for reasons stated see supra note
46 - Wally was not unclaimed property. Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445,
at *60-67. Additionally, Jaray's claim would not have been barred under New
York law, because the statute of limitations would not begin to run until Wally
entered the United States in 1997. Id. at *67-69.
54. Id. at *69-70. The Leopold could only prove laches by showing that
Jaray and her heirs "unreasonably delayed in starting an action and that the
Leopold suffered undue prejudice as a result." Id. at *69-70 (citing, inter alia,
Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 153 A.D.2d 143, 149 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1990)). Resolving such a claim involves a "fact-intensive inquiry into
the conduct and background of both parties in order to determine the relative
equities .... [and] [t]he record here does not provide the factual basis for a
finding as to delay and prejudice." Wally Ill, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at
*70.
55. See also supra text accompanying note 50. The court also found that
Leopold's conduct satisfied the government's alternate allegation of conversion.
Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *71-76.
56. Id. at *76-81. The court had no doubt from the allegations in the
complaint that Dr. Leopold "either knew or could deduce that Wally was
stolen .... deliberate ignorance is no defense." Id. at *78. The court treated an
argument that Austrian Law placed the ownership of Wally in reasonable
dispute, thereby defeating the scienter requirement, as inapplicable to the
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arguments based on the rule of lenity," the NSPA's statutory
purpose,58 and due process. 9 The court allowed the government to
proceed with the action.
Wally remains in New York, in the custody of MoMA.6°
Barring any appeal from the court's decision on the application of
the NSPA or some of the arguable jurisdictional issues, the next
phase in the proceeding will be to determine whether Wally was
actually stolen from Jaray, and if the painting should then be
returned to her heirs.61 Given the court's in-depth analysis of the
Leopold's legal claim (or absence thereof) to Wally,62 there seems
little doubt that a trial will result in civil forfeiture of the painting.
The only possible issue left for legal resolution in this regard is the
weight given to dueling experts on Austrian law on the issue of
prescriptive possession.63
Whether the Jaray heirs will be able to establish ownership of
the painting will depend in large part on the court's analysis of the
laches issue.' Even though the heirs' claim is not barred by the
statute of limitations,65 under New York law laches would be an
inquiry - this argument actually cut against the Leopold's claim for prescriptive
possession - and further determined that Jaray "owns Wally under Austrian law;
Wally is thus not the subject of an objectively colorable ownership dispute." Id.
at *80. The court imputed Dr. Leopold's guilty knowledge to the Leopold. Id.
at *76-81.
57. Id. at *81-84.
58. Id. at *84-88. The dominant purpose of the NSPA is to effect "forfeiture
of property which has been imported into the United States or is about to be
exported in violation of law," and its application effects the congressional
purpose of discouraging both "the receiving of stolen goods and the initial
taking," even if a "world-renowned museum" such as MoMA is implicated. Id.
at *86.
59. Id. at *89-94.
60. Celestine Bohlen, Judge Revives Case of Nazi-Looted Art, N.Y. TIMES,
April 27, 2002, at B9.
61. Id.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53, 56.
63. See Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *52-60.
64. See supra text accompanying note 54.
65. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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independent defense to the heirs' claim to Wally.66 However, the
court applied Austrian law to the statute of limitations defense,67
and may also apply Austrian law to the laches defense. Austrian
law on laches was not briefed for the motion to dismiss, but it is
probable that as a civil law country, Austrian law has no corollary
to the common law defense of laches.68 If New York law on
laches is applied to the case, there is evidence on the record to
suggest that Jaray and her heirs were less than diligent in pursuing
Wally.
69
Even if the heirs cannot establish a claim to the painting, the
court's analysis basically forecloses the Leopold's claim as well.7"
66. New York employs a demand-and-refusal rule to affix the time when the
statute of limitations begins to run. Collins, supra note 18, at 132. "Under the
demand-and-refusal rule, an owner's cause of action does not accrue until the
owner demands that the purchaser return the property and the purchaser
refuses." However, the defense of laches can be raised separately from the
statute of limitations defense, see Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v.
Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991); Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem
v. Christie's Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7664(KMW), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1999), and basically becomes a substitute for the "due
diligence" component of the statute of limitations defense seemingly abrogated
in Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). The defense of
laches in New York requires a showing that "a plaintiffs unreasonable delay
caused [the defendant] undue prejudice." Collins, supra note 18, at 133. See
also Wertheimer v. Cirker's Hayes Storage Warehouse, Inc., No. 105575/00,
2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 693, at *13-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 2001).
Applying New York demand and refusal rule to statute of limitations defense
and applying Arizona law to the defense of laches; Arizona law is substantially
similar to New York law on the defense of laches.
67. See also supra text accompanying note 53.
68. See Warin v. Wildenstein & Co., Inc., No. 115143/99, 2001 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 542, at *26 (applying French law and determining that the doctrine of
laches is unavailable under French law, which, like Austria, is a civil law
country).
69. See supra notes 6-7. Jaray was aware of the painting's location, at the
Belvedere, and then later in the possession of Dr. Leopold, for a significant
period of time before her death in 1969. The heirs likely also knew that
Leopold and later the Leopold had Wally.
70. It is possible that a finding of laches would return the painting to the
Leopold.
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Under these circumstances, the Leopold may not be able to reclaim
the painting, and, if no settlement is reached in this case,
Wally may eventually end up in the possession of the United States
government, an outcome that is likely less than desirable for all
parties involved.7'
It is difficult to understand exactly why this case has progressed
as it has. The government's intervention is perhaps
understandable in the context of policy considerations and a
renewed governmental interest in the recovery of holocaust
assets. Aside from economic considerations,73 however, the
opposition of MoMA74 and numerous other museums who filed
71. Except, perhaps, for whoever acquires the painting at a subsequent
auction.
72. In December of 1998, the State Department hosted the Washington
Conference on Holocaust-Era assets, during which the over forty countries in
attendance adopted eleven principles to assist in settling issues surrounding
Nazi-looted art. Falconer, supra note 41, at 390. Afterwards, the United States
formed the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the
United States; the Commission's findings are compiled in PLUNDER AND
RESTITUTION: THE U.S. AND HOLOCAUST VICTIMS ASSETS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND STAFF REPORT 15 (2000). Among the Commission's findings was
a note related to the Wally saga that may or may not have affected the decision
in Wally III "[W]ith respect to the application of the "sting" doctrine in cases
involving post-war recoveries by the United States .... 'In [Wally I], a federal
district court in New York held that U.S. forces charged with recovering stolen
items were acting on behalf of the true owners and that such recovery prohibited
continued treatment of the item as stolen property. Nothing in this
Commission's research indicates that the U.S. Army was acting on behalf of
owners or their heirs."' Spiegler, supra note 26, at 311 (quoting PLUNDER AND
RESTITUTION, supra this note, at 17).
73. The MoMA is a party to this action as bailee of Wally, and "the Leopold
has threatened MoMA with liability for any damage it suffers" as a result of this
action. See Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *12-18.
74. The opposition of MoMA is interesting in this case given the fact that
Ronald S. Lauder, MoMA chairman, is also chairman of the Commission for
Art Recovery of the World Jewish Congress, an organization that has been
instrumental in recovery of Nazi-looted art (and is currently working to force a
Spanish museum to return a Nazi-looted Pissarro, see Daly, supra note 10).
Bohlen, supra note 41. Perhaps the opposition is explainable by Lauder's
"weakness" for Schiele works.
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amicus curiae briefs in this case75 represents a direct conflict with
their previous public pledge to assist the government in the
recovery of Holocaust assets.76 The opposition of the Republic of
Austria is even more difficult to reconcile in light of the fact that
Austria has taken affirmative steps to return Nazi-looted art to
claimants.77 Given these considerations, as well as international
pressure to rid museums of Nazi-looted art," it is difficult to
explain why this proceeding has developed to such an adversarial
degree. Clearly, the best and easiest solution to this case is some
form of settlement that reflects the interests of all parties
involved.79
75. Bohlen, supra note 60. The American Association of Museums
submitted a brief in Wally III. Wally I1, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at * 1.
76. Both the American Association of Museum Directors and the Association
of Art Museum Directors publicly pledged provenance review of works in their
collections, and also pledged to formulate methods for resolving ownership
disputes in a non-adversarial fashion. Lippman, supra note 7, at 89-90. These
representations were made in light of the 1998 Washington Conference on
Holocaust-Era assets, and were repeated to Congress in 2000. See Restitution of
Holocaust Assets: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial
Services, 106th Congress (2000). Numerous museums have returned paintings
to their rightful owners pursuant to this policy. See also supra text
accompanying note 26.
77. See infra note 95. Also, the Viennese police have seized a Schiele of
questionable provenance, and several others have been withdrawn from auction
due to seizure concerns. Peter S. Green, Austrian Police Seize Art Said to Be
Stolen by Nazis, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 16, 2002, at B7; Schiele Painting
Withdrawn From Auction on Nazi Theft Suspicion, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Nov. 19, 2002. See also Robert Schwartz, The Limits of the Law: A
Call for a New Attitude Toward Artwork Stolen During World War II, 32
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1,25-26 (1998); See also Altmann II, 317 F.3d 954.
78. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 77, at 24 et seq.; NORMAN PALMER,
MUSEUMS AND THE HOLOCAUST 17 (2000); Sophia Kishkovsky, A New
Glasnost on War's Looted Art, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at El; Ronald
Lauder, The Power of an Idea, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 30, 2003, at 06.
79. A possible settlement option is presented by the claim for Degas'
Landscape with Smokestacks, TIERNANS, supra note 25. The parties in that
dispute agreed to sell the painting to The Art Institute of Chicago and split the
proceeds.
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V. ADELE BLOCH - BAUER'S KLIMTS: BEQUEST OR THEFT?
The Republic of Austria's role in preventing the return of Nazi-
looted artwork to its rightful owners forms a more central theme in
Maria Altmann's story. In 1907, Gutstave Klimt completed his
portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer.8" The painting was commissioned
by Adele's husband, Ferdinand Bloch, a wealthy Czech-Jewish
sugar magnate.8 The Blochs lived in Vienna, and at the time of
her death in 1925, Adele possessed six Klimt paintings.8 2 Adele's
will requested that Ferdinand donate the paintings to the Austrian
Gallery upon his death.83
When the Nazis entered Vienna in 1938 and declared the
Anschluss,84 Ferdinand left behind all his possessions and fled to
Zurich.85 The Nazis divided up Ferdinand's property, and at least
five of the Klimts were taken by Dr. Erich Fuerher, the Nazi
lawyer appointed to liquidate Ferdinand's estate.86 Fuerher later
traded or sold four of these paintings to Austrian museums, and
80. Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 959.
81. Id.
82. Id. Adele owned Adele Bloch Bauer I & II, Amalie Zuckerkandl, Apple
Tree I, Beechwood, and House in Unterach am Attersee.
83. Id. When the will was probated, "the paintings were found to be part of
Ferdinand's property, not Adele's." Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F.
Supp. 2d 1187, 1192-93 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("Altmann 1').
84. Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 959. Much of Austria sympathized with the
Nazis, and Hitler capitalized on this popular acceptance of the Nazi invasion by
convening a "mock council of ministers.., which adopted the resolution for the
Anschluss. The legitimate Austrian cabinet leaders were arrested and deported
to concentration camps. The country was split into single districts under the
control of Berlin."
85. Id.
86. Id. at 959-60. Ferdinand had a large collection that contained works by a
number of Austrian Masters in the style coveted by Hitler as Germanic art.
Hitler and Goering took several paintings for their own collections and other
were purchased for Hitler's planned museum in Linz. As for the remainder of
Ferdinand's property, his sugar company was Aryanized, his Vienna home used
as German railway headquarters, and Reinhardt Heydrich, author of the "Final
Solution," took up residence in Ferdinand's castle outside Prague.
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kept one for his private collection. 7 The sixth Klimt ended up
with a private dealer, and eventually also made its way into the
Austrian Gallery.88 Ferdinand died in 1945, and his will revoked
all prior wills and left his estate to his heirs, one of whom is Maria
Altmann.8 9
Altmann also fled Austria, and relocated to Hollywood,
California." Altmann and the other Bloch-Bauer heirs tried to
recover the Klimts after the war, but were unsuccessful. 9' The
Austrian Gallery claimed rightful possession through Adele's
will. 92 Altmann attempted to file a lawsuit in Austria to recover
87. Id. Fuerher traded Adele Bloch Bauer I and Apple Tree I to the Austrian
Gallery in 1941, claiming to "deliver the paintings in fulfillment of the last will
and testament of Adele," sold Adele Bloch Bauer II to the Gallery, and
Beechwood to the Museum of the City of Vienna. Fuerher kept Houses in
Unterach.
88. Altmann I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 (the whereabouts of Amalie
Zuckerkandl were unknown until it turned up "in the hands of art dealer Vita
Kunstler, who donated it to the Gallery in 1988").
89. Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 960. Ferdinand left his estate to one nephew and
two nieces.
90. Id.
91. Id. Official policy of the Second Republic of Austria made voidable all
transactions motivated by the Nazis, and should have voided Fuerher's trades
and sales with the Austrian Gallery. The Museum of the City of Vienna offered
to return Beechwood for a refund of the purchase price, but the heirs rejected
these terms. Altmann's brother initially reclaimed Houses in Unterach from
Fuerhrer's private collection, but the heirs were unable to procure export
permits for the painting and several other recovered artworks. The heirs'
Austrian attorney, Dr. Rinesch, negotiated an agreement with Austria's Federal
Monument Agency, and obtained export permits for many of Ferdinand's other
works "in exchange for a 'donation' of the Klimt paintings." Id. at 960-61.
Pursuant to this agreement, Rinesch gave Houses in Unterach to the Austrian
Gallery, and Beechwood was transferred to the Gallery. Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp.
2d at 1193. The heirs never signed this agreement, and this practice of extorting
donations was later declared illegal by the Austrian government. Altmann II,
317 F.3d at 960. Altmann was unaware of this agreement until 1999, and
denied granting Rinesch any power to negotiate with the Gallery or donate the
paintings on behalf of the heirs. Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1195 n9.
92. Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 960. The Austrian Gallery asserted that the
paintings were bequeathed by Adele's will. Rinesch agreed in the document
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the Klimts in September 1999,"3 prompted in part by the litigation
over Schiele's Wally,94 and in part by the Austrian government's
decision not to return the paintings even after it had set up a
Committee to review claims for paintings in the Austrian Gallery.95
Altmann's suit would have sought to overturn this decision, but
she was unable to pay the filing fees required to bring the suit.96
Altmann instead sued the Republic of Austria and the Austrian
Gallery in federal court in California.97 Austria and the Gallery
filed a motion to dismiss which the district court denied.98
"donating" the Klimts to the Austrian Gallery that the family would
acknowledge the donation as stemming from Adele's will, justifying this
decision to the family "by claiming that Adele's will would be sufficient to give
the museum a claim to the six paintings." Altmann now claims that the language
in Adele's will was merely precatory, which would make it unenforceable under
both U.S and Austrian law. Id. at 960 nl.
93. Id. at 961.
94. See Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445.
95. See Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 961. Wally III brought allegations that the
Austrian Gallery possessed looted art. In response, the Austrian Minister for
Education and Culture "opened up the Ministry's archives to permit research
into the provenance of the national collection," and the Austrian government set
up a Commission to advise on the return of artworks. Despite discovering
documents that called into question the Austrian Gallery's legal claim to the
Klimts through Adele's will, the Commission recommended against returning
the paintings. The Austrian Parliament approved a law in 1998 that allowed
return of 500 looted works in Austrian museums. See also Lippman, supra note
7, at 88-89; NORMAN PALMER, MUSEUMS AND HOLOCAUST 178-79 (2000) (for
the text of this law). Obviously, the Klimts were not among these works;
however, the act returned 200 works to the Rothschild family, which netted the
family nearly $90 million in a subsequent auction at Christie's. Falconer,
supra note 41, at 416-17.
96. Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 961. Under Austrian law, Altmann's required
filing fee was a percentage of the recoverable amount, which would have been
about $1.6 million. Altmann applied for and was granted a reduction in filing
fees, but still found the cost prohibitive.
97. Id. (Altmann filed her complaint in the Central District of California on
August 22, 2000).
98. Id. (Austria and the Gallery moved for dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, lack of venue, failure to join indispensable parties, and
forum non conveniens); see also Altmann I, supra note 82.
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The basic issue before the circuit court on appeal was whether or
not the Federal Sovereign and Immunities Act99 ("FSIA") granted
the district court jurisdiction over the Republic of Austria and the
state-owned Austrian Gallery.' 0 Altmann contended that Austria's
conduct fell within the expropriation exception to the FSIA, 0 ' and
Austria argued that the FSIA could not be retrospectively applied
to conduct pre-dating passage of the FSIA.0 2
The court applied the Landgraf v. USI Film Prod's"°3
retrospective application test to the dispute, and considered the
reasoning in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany"°4 to
determine that application of the FSIA in this case would not be
impermissibly retroactive.0 5 The court reasoned that, because the
FSIA is basically a jurisdictional statute, on the facts present its
operation "effected merely a change of jurisdiction ... [and] did
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1602-1611 (2002).
100. Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 958, 962-69.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2002). "A foreign state shall not be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States or of the States in any case...
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue
and... that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or
operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States ......
102. Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 962. The FSIA become law in 1977. See 28
U.S.C. § 1602 (2002). There is a circuit split as to whether or not the FSIA can
be applied prior to conduct that occurred prior to the Department of State's
issuance of the Tate Letter in 1952, the moment when "'the American position
changed and the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was adopted'..." Id.
at 964 (quoting Edward D. Re, Human Rights, Domestic Courts, and Effective
Remedies, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 581, 583-84 (1993)). The text of the 1952
Tate Letter is reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682, 713 (1976).
103. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod's, 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994). The
Landgraf test asks: "(1) whether the [FSIA] attaches new legal consequences to
events completed before its enactment;" and "(2) whether applying the FSIA
would 'impair rights a party possessed when he acted"' Princz v. Federal
Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1178 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121
(1995) (quoting Landgraf 511 U.S. at 280).
104. Princz, 26 F.3d 1166.
105. Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 962-67.
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not alter liability under the applicable substantive law."' 6  The
court then determined that, based on a widespread change
internationally in adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, and because the transactions at issue were repudiated by
the Austrian government, it could not legitimately expect to
receive sovereign immunity for these actions.0 7
The court then found the expropriation exception to the FSIA
applicable to Austria's conduct because it committed a taking that
violated international law.'0 8  The court also found that the
106. Id. at 964. This finding was directed towards the first prong of the
Landgraf test.
107. Id. at 964-67. The court noted that Austria itself adopted the restrictive
immunity theory after World War I, and that Belgium, Italy, Egypt, Switzerland,
France, and Greece had adopted the theory by the 1920s. Id. at 966. The court
stated that it was "[m]indful that such seizures explicitly violated... Austria's
obligation under the Hague Convention... and that Austria's Second Republic
officially repudiated all Nazi transactions in 1946 .... [just because] Austria
and the United States were no longer on opposite sides of World War 1I at the
time the Federal Monument Agency attempted to extort the Klimt paintings
does not mean that Austria could reasonably expect the granting of immunity
for an act so closely associated with the atrocities of war... Austrians could not
have had any expectation.., that the State Department would have
recommended immunity as a matter of 'grace and comity' for the wrongful
appropriation of Jewish property." Id. at 965. The court also distinguished
cases that held the FSIA inapplicable to pre-1952 events as involving "economic
transactions entered into long before the facts of this case arose, and unlike here,
prior to the defendant country's acceptance of the restrictive principle of
sovereign immunity and to the widespread acceptance of the restrictive theory."
Id. at 967.
108. Id. at 967-68. The expropriation exception to the FSIA "'is based upon
the general presumption that states abide by international law and, hence,
violations of international law are not sovereign acts."' Id. at 967 (quoting West
v. Multibanco Comerex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied,
507 U.S. 1017 (1993)). The taking of the Klimts would only be valid under
international law if: (1) it served a public purpose; (2) aliens were not
discriminated against or singled out for regulation by the state; and (3) just
compensation was paid. Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 968. The court found that "the
Klimt paintings were wrongfully and discriminatorily appropriated in violation
of international law .. . [as] The Nazis did not even pretend to take the Klimts
for a public purpose; instead, Dr. Fuerher sold them for personal gain or
exchanged them to supplement his private collection;" and that "their taking
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Austrian Gallery is sufficiently engaged in commercial activity in
the United States to justify application of the exception.' ° The
court also decided that Austria and the Gallery had sufficient
minimum contacts to justify personal jurisdiction."'  The court
allowed Altmann's claim to proceed in district court."'
Altmann survived Austria's and the Gallery's motion to dismiss,
at least initially. The Ninth Circuit denied Austria's request for a
rehearing en banc," 2 but Austria then petitioned for a writ of
certiorari which the Supreme Court granted."3  Austria also
applied for and received a stay of the court's mandate."4 But even
if the Supreme Court affirms the court's decision and Altmann is
allowed to pursue her claim in district court, she could face an
uphill battle in establishing her claim to the Klimts.
Altmann's complaint sought recovery under a number of legal
appears discriminatory. Altmann is a Jewish refugee, now a United States
citizen, who is a descendant of a Czech family whose property was looted by the
Nazis because of their religious heritage;" and "the Austrian government has not
yet returned the paintings to Altmann and her family or justly compensated
them for the value of their paintings." Id.
109.
Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 969. The court found that the Austrian Gallery's
publishing of books in the United States that contained reproductions of the
Klimts was sufficient to show that the Gallery is engaging in commercial
activity in the United States. Id.
110. Id. at 969-7 1. The court cited the books published by the Gallery,
tourism efforts by the Austrian government that publicized exhibits at the
Gallery featuring the Klimts, and Austria's "operation of consulates,
sponsorship of tourist relations and trade, and promotion of Austrian business
interests." Id. at 970-71.
111. Id. at 974.
112. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 327 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 2003).
113. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 156 L. Ed. 2d 703, 72 U.S.L.W. 3234
(2003). The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari is limited to the question of
whether the FSIA can be retroactively applied in this case. The Court will will
hear case in 2004. See David D. Savage, High Court to Hear Miranda, Art
Cases; Justices Agree to Decide Issues About Juvenile Rights and Austria's
Claim of Immunity in a Suit Over Nazi-era Theft of Klimt Paintings, Los
ANGELES TIMES, October 1, 2003, at MI.
114. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 123 S.Ct. 2129, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1057
(2003).
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theories." 5 The crux of Altmann's complaint is a replevin action
under California law for recovery of the painting."6 Although
California law may apply to a replevin action, Austrian law should
be used to determine Altmann's ownership interest in the
Klimts." '7 Although the decision in Altmann II as to the
application of the expropriation exception to the FSIA"8 should
assist in the resolution of this issue, the district court will have to
determine the legal effect under Austrian law of the alleged
language in Adele's will" 9 and the agreement between Rinesch
and the Gallery to "donate" the Klimts 2 °
Additionally, Austria will likely argue that the Gallery gained
good title to the Klimts through the Austrian law of prescription, 2'
and that Altmann's claim to the Klimts has expired under the Third
Restitution Act. 22  Austria's claim to prescriptive title will
probably fail due to evidence discovered in the Gallery's
archives'23 that indicates the Gallery lacks the requisite good-faith
115. Altmann seeks a declaration that the Klimts should be returned pursuant
to the 1998 Austrian law, replevin under California law, rescission of Rinesch's
agreement with the Gallery, damages for expropriation and conversion, damages
for violation of international law, imposition of a constructive trust, restitution
based on unjust enrichment, and disgorgement of profits under the California
Unfair Business Practices law. Altmann I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1197.
116. Id.
117. See Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at 53. Determining title to
Wally under Austrian law because "although federal law determines whether the
property has been stolen, local law 'controls the analytically prior issue of (a)
whether any person or entity has a property interest in the item such that it can
be stolen, and (b) whether the receiver of the item has a property interest in it."'
(quoting Wally 1, 105 F. Supp. 288).
118. See supra text accompanying note 108.
119. See supra text accompanying note 92.
120. See supra text accompanying note 91.
121. See supra text accompanying note 52.
122. See supra text accompanying note 53.
123. Altmann I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1194-95. Dr. Garzarolli of the Austrian
Gallery expressed doubt in a 1948 letter that Adele's will actually granted the
Gallery title to the paintings. Id. A search of the archives also revealed
documentation that the Klimts passed through Nazi hands en route to the
Gallery's collections. Id. at 1195.
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possession to gain prescriptive title.Y14  The success of any
argument Austria attempts to make in accordance with the Third
Restitution Act will depend on the viability of Altmann's claim for
ownership under the Austrian Civil Code.Y
2 5
Austria will also raise statute of limitations and laches defenses
to Altmann's replevin action. If Austrian law is applicable to these
issues, Altmann's claim is not subject to limitation under the
Austrian Civil Code, provided that she has a viable ownership
claim under the Code.2 6 Austrian law on laches was not resolved
in Wally III 27  Any laches determination would depend on the
legal effect given to Rinesch's "donation" of the Klimts to the
Gallery.'28  If California law is applicable to these defenses,
29
124. See supra text accompanying note 52. Paragraph 1475 of the Austrian
Civil Code states that "a possessor of property may acquire title to that property
if the possession is based on legal title (purchase or exchange) and extends
throughout the [three year] statutory period accompanied by the possessor's
belief that the possession is lawful." Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at
55. The documentation discovered in the Gallery's archives, as well as
Rinesch's negotiation efforts should defeat good-faith possession. Supra notes
91,120.
125. See Wally II, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at 60-65. There are no facts
to show that the heirs ever made a claim in accordance with the Third
Restitution Act, but even if they had not, if Altmann has a viable ownership
claim to the Klimts under the Austrian Civil Code, the Third Restitution Act
would not bar Altmann's claim. See id. Wally III is unclear as to what
provision of the Austrian Civil Code would grant a viable ownership claim, but
the implication is that, if the Klimts were stolen by the Nazis as was Wally, then
Altmann would have an ownership claim under the Austrian Civil Code. Id.
Altmann II established that the Nazis stole the Klimts, so Altmann should be
able to win this argument. See Altmann II, 317 F.3d 954.
126. Supra notes 53, 124.
127. See supra text accompanying note 68.
128. See supra text accompanying note 91. It would be difficult to show that
Altmann and the heirs "slept on their property rights" when they were not even
aware that they had title to the paintings.
129. California employs a governmental interest analysis to choice of law
issues, which determines choice of law in statute of limitations conflicts by
asking whether or not applying California's statute of limitations advances the
statute's underlying policies. See, e.g., Ashland Chemical Co. v. Provence, 181
Cal. Rptr. 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
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either under the former statute of limitations or under newly
enacted California law, Altmann's claim would probably not be
subject to limitation.13 ° Laches appears unavailable in California as
a defense to a replevin action.1 31
Whatever transpires next in this case, it can be presumed that
Austria will fight any attempt to return the paintings to Altmann.
Although the Austrian government has made progress in returning
Nazi-looted art to its rightful owners,13 1 its reluctance to settle this
issue with Altmann can be explained by examining Austria's
economic motivation. In addition to profits that flow to Austria
through tourism in connection with the Klimts, 3 3 the paintings
themselves are valued at $150 million. 134
VI. CARLOTA LANDSBERG'S PICASSO
Prestigious museums and recalcitrant governments are not alone,
however, in their efforts to retain possession of Nazi-looted art.
Private art collectors also continue to rebuff requests to return
works in their collections that were taken from their rightful
owners during the war, preferring litigation to settlement. Such is
130. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 338 (establishes a three year statute of limitations
that "accrues upon discovery of the whereabouts of a stolen article of artistic
significance"). See Altmann I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1195 nil (citing Society of
California Pioneers v. Baker, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
Altmann I determined that Altmann did not actually discover her claim to the
Klimts until 1999. However, California courts may follow the New York rule
on discovery as discussed in Lubell, supra note 66; in this scenario the district
court may conduct a further objective inquiry into Altmann's attempts to
discover her rights to the Klimts. The statute of limitations picture becomes
much clearer if newly-enacted CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 354.3 is applied to the case,
which purports to retroactively extend until December 31, 2010, the statute of
limitations for recovery of "Holocaust-era artwork."
131. In California, laches is defense only to equitable actions, and not actions
at law such as replevin. See Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 752
(1948).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 77, 95.
133. See Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 970-71.
134. Tom Tugend, Lawyer Fights for Nazi-looted Art Works, JERUSALEM
POST, April 9, 2003.
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the crux of a current dispute over the ownership of Picasso's
Femme en blanc.35
Picasso painted Femme en blanc in 1922, and Robert and
Carlota Landsberg purchased it in 1926 or 1927 and took it to their
residence in Berlin.'36 After Robert died in 1932, and hostility
against Jews in Germany increased 1933, Carlota fled to New
York where she settled in 1940 or 1941.137 Before Carlota left
Berlin, she sent the Picasso to Paris for safekeeping with Paris art
dealer J.K. Thannhauser' 38 The painting was taken from
Thannhauser's Gallery by the Nazis in 1940 during the occupation
of Paris.139  The Picasso was then in undetermined private
ownership until it was exported to New York in 1975.' 4o James
135. Also known as Femme assise. Reich, supra note 21.
136. Id.
137. Id. Carlota and her daughter left Berlin shortly after Kristallnacht, Nov.
9-10, 1938, "when rampaging Nazis and their sympathizers burned synagogues,
Jewish-owned businesses and homes in Germany and Austria."
138. Reich, supra note 14; Bennigson v. Alsdorf, No. BC287294 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. 2002) (the text of a letter written from Thannhauser to Carlota in 1958
("Thannhauser letter") reads in part "in 1938 or 1939 you sent your Painting by
Picasso... to me at my house in Paris").
139. Reich, supra note 21; Bennigson, No. BC287294 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002)
(also from the Thannhauser letter: "Upon the occupation of Paris in 1940, when
we were no longer in Paris and the house was closed, the entire contents of the
four-story building - and with it your painting - were stolen .... during the four
day long violent German national socialist plundering everything was taken out
of the four-story house during the night and placed in trucks").
140. Bennigson, No. BC287294 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002). Sarah Jackson is the
Historic Claims Director of the Art Loss Register, the organization that did
much of the preliminary investigation in this dispute. The Picasso was exported
from France in 1975 by the Galerie Renou & Poyet without attached
provenance. Id. at 9. The current owner of the Renou & Poyet would not reveal
the provenance of the Picasso, but stated that "he had the picture on
consignment from a private collector who had obtained the picture from an art
dealer who.., had faced a Paris tribunal on having traded with the Germans
during the occupation." Id. The owner promised to "provide the name of the
private collector and other gallery on the proviso that he was given a hold
harmless by the current owner and claimant." Id. The Renou & Poyet was
known as the Renou & Colle during the war, and was noted in an OSS
(forerunner of the current CIA) report as a "Firm of art dealers who handled
2004]
25
Wissbroecker: Six Klimts, a Picasso, & a Schiele: Recent Litigation Attempts to
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART. & ENT LAW
and Marilyn Alsdorf bought Femme en blanc from art dealer
Stephen Hahn in New York the same year.'41
The Alsdorfs kept the Picasso in their Chicago apartment142 until
Marilyn 4 3 sent the painting to the David Tunkl Fine Art Gallery in
Los Angeles for possible sale in September of 2001.'" Tunkl
located a Parisian art dealer interested in the painting,'45 and sent
the Picasso to Switzerland where it was held in the Freeport for
inspection by the prospective purchaser.'46 The Parisian art dealer
contacted the Art Loss Register ("ALR") to conduct a provenance
search on the Picasso.'47 The search revealed that the painting had
been stolen from Thannhauser's collection during the war after
being placed there by Carlota' 48 The ALR then contacted
looted art .... Schenker documents indicate sales to German buyers." Id. at 8-
9.
141. Reich, supra note 21. When the Alsdorfs bought the painting, the
receipt read "Private Collection, Paris." Hahn purports to have no further
information on the painting's provenance.
142. Jean Guccione, Man Sues Over Picasso Stolen by Nazis; Heir of the
Jewish Owner is Seeking $10 Million From Artcollector or Return of Painting,
L. A. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 2002, at M1.
143. James died in 1991. Reich, supra note 21.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Bennigson, No. BC287294 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 4-8. The ALR first noted that the painting was listed in the
"Repetoire des beins spoiles" (sic) ("Catalog of French Property Stolen Between
1939-45"), and recorded under Thannhauser's name. Id. at 4. Thannhauser's
records at the Silva Casa Foundation in Geneva were examined and showed that
the painting had indeed been in Thannhauser's possession and was later stolen
by the Nazis. Id. at 4-5. The ALR advised the Parisian art dealer of the
Picasso's history, and then contacted Marilyn Alsdorf, who told the ALR that
she had purchased the painting from Hahn in 1975. Id. at 5-6. Alsdorf directed
the ALR to discuss the matter further with her attorney. Id. at 6. The ALR then
conducted further investigation and discovered through records at the
Wiedergutmachungsamt von Berlin that the German government, in 1965, had
determined that the Picasso belonged not to Thannhauser, but to Carlota
Landsberg. Id. Indeed, the German government had, in 1969, paid
compensation to Carlota for the actions of the Third Reich, after determining
that the Nazis had taken the Picasso from Thannhauser's gallery. Id. at 7.
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Carlota's grandson and heir, Thomas Bennigson. 141
Initially, negotiations concerning the Picasso were handled by
the ALR. 5° However, once the ALR brought Carlota's heir,
Bennigson, into the picture, Alsdorf's initial cooperative attitude
chilled.' Once negotiations broke down, Bennigson hired an
attorney and brought a replevin action in California state court
against Alsdorf and the Tunkl art gallery.'52
Bennigson also requested a preliminary injunction to prevent
Alsdorf from taking the Picasso back to her Chicago apartment,'53
and immediately filed an ex parte application for a temporary
restraining order in an attempt to keep the Picasso in Los
Angeles.'54 The TRO was granted the next day (after Alsdorf's
attorney was notified).'55 But Tunkl and Alsdorf had already
removed the painting from Tunkl's gallery and shipped it back to
Additional documentation was found that substantiated Carlota's ownership
from the Wiedergutmachungsamt von Berlin and the Ministere des Affaires
Etrangeres in France. Id. at 6-7.
149. Reich, supra note 21.
150. Id.
151. Id. The ALR's initial research pointed to Thannhauser as the claimant.
When the ALR first contacted Alsdorf about the painting in April 2002,
"Alsdorf immediately began discussions to resolve the matter," and authorized
the ALR to "negotiate directly with my attorney Stephen Bernard as he has my
complete and absolute authority to negotiate a resolution of your claim of
interests." When Bennigson came into the picture, Alsdorf broke off
negotiations, stating in her court declaration that: "When I learned that the
[ALR] had changed its position about the history of the painting, after it had
made clear representations regarding its authority to resolve another claimant's
claim, I felt very uncomfortable about the reliability of the conclusions that the
[ALR] had reached about the painting." Alsdorf's attorney stated that: "When
this issue came up, I believe Mrs. Alsdorf felt extremely uncomfortable with the
fact that there were negotiations ongoing with a party whose standing and
whose representation was at best questionable.... I'm not suggesting that they
were lying or [operating] in bad faith, I'm only suggesting that, not having the
benefit of hindsight, what she [Alsdorf] was hearing was somebody who was
unclear as to who they were representing."
152. Bennigson, No. BC287294 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002).
153. Id.
154. Application for T.R.O, Id.
155. Guccione, supra note 142.
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Chicago, just hours before the court granted the TRO.'56 Alsdorf
then filed a motion to change the lawsuit's venue from California
to Illinois, which the court granted."i 7 Bennigson has appealed the
court's ruling and still hopes to keep the case in California.'58
No matter which state, California or Illinois,'59 eventually hears
this case, its resolution may depend in large part on applying
French law 6' and perhaps New York law' 6' to determine whether
or not Asldorf acquired good title to the painting. Under the
French law, even a thief can acquire good title if he maintains
"continuous, peaceful, open and unequivocal possession" over a
thirty-year prescriptive period.'62 Assuming that possession by the
156. Id. Bennigson's attorney stated that "he would ask the judge to modify
his order and allow the painting to remain with Alsdorf in Chicago until the
dispute is resolved." There was some concern that the painting might be
damaged if shipped back to California. See Vincent Cinisomo-Lara, Picasso
Suit, CITY NEWS SERVICE, June 18, 2003.
157. Id. The court ruled that "there is no jurisdiction for the suit in
[California] because the defendant and the artwork are both in Chicago."
158. Id. Bennigson's attorney feels that the jurisdictional issue is controlled
by Supreme Court precedent that was disregarded by the court.
159. Transfer to federal court is not possible, as Tunkl's presence as a
defendant in the case defeats diversity jurisdiction. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. 267 (1806).
160. French law has been applied by New York state and federal courts to
determine whether or not title passed, and then choice of law rules were applied
separately to determine when the action accrued. See Greek Orthodox
Patriarchate, No. 98 Civ. 7664(KMW), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257
(applying German law to ownership acquisition issues). Of course, either
California or Illinois may apply their own replevin law to determine ownership.
See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 288-290 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Indiana
replevin law to determine ownership of the Kanakaria mosaic looted from
Cyprus).
161. New York law may apply to the validity of Alsdorf s purchase, if
indeed good title passed from the Renou and Poyet.
162. See Warin, No. 115143/99, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 542, at *20-21
(examining article 2279 of the French Civil Code). Alsdorf also disputes that
the painting was stolen rather than sold prior to Nazi occupation. Reich, supra
note 21.
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anonymous French holder163 began shortly after the Picasso's theft
in 1940,164 thirty-five years passed before the painting was
exported to New York in 1975.65 During this time, the
anonymous holder may have acquired good title to the painting
under French law, which may have passed to Alsdorf 66 when she
purchased the painting from Hahn in New York in 1975.67
However, if the anonymous holder did not acquire good title,
neither could Alsdorf under New York law.'68 This inquiry would
require further development of the record.
Assuming that Alsdorf did not acquire good title to the painting,
the next question would be which statute of limitations is
applicable to the case. California law would not bar Bennigson's
claim. 69 Illinois law is not as settled as to when the statute of
limitations began to run on Bennigson's claim; the discovery rule
163. See supra text accompanying note 140.
164. See supra text accompanying note 139.
165. See supra text accompanying note 140.
166. See Porter v. Wertz, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) and U.C.C.
§§ 1-203, 2-403 (detailing the rights of a good faith purchaser).
167. See supra text accompanying note 141.
168. See Porter, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
169. See supra text accompanying note 130. The statute of limitations in
force at the time this action commenced was CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 338, which
establishes a three year statute of limitations that "accrues upon discovery of the
whereabouts of a stolen article of artistic significance." See Altmann I, 142 F.
Supp. 2d, at 1195 nl (citing Society of California Pioneers v. Baker, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). Bennigson has argued that the new
California statue of limitations in CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 354.3 should
retroactively apply to this action, which would extend time for bringing a claim
to recover "Holocaust-era artwork" until December 31, 2010. Application for
T.R.O. at 10-11, Bennigson, No. BC287294 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002). Indeed,
Bennigson alleged that the specter of this statute was the driving force behind
Alsdorf s decision to take the painting back to Chicago. Id. at 6. An additional
wrinkle in this analysis is that CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 354.3 covers artworks in the
possession of a museum or art gallery - now that the Picasso is no longer at the
Tunkl gallery, this statute may not apply. In any event, Bennigson demanded
the painting in 2002 when he learned of its whereabouts, and commenced this
suit the same year. Application for T.R.O. at 10, Bennigson, No. BC287294
(Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002). This should be sufficient to overcome any statute of
limitations problems in California.
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is not codified in Illinois, 7 as it is in California.'7' As to which
statute of limitations would apply in each jurisdiction, California's
governmental interest analysis 72 for choice of law would probably
170. See Mucha v. King, 795 F.2d 602, 611-612 (7th Cir. 1986). The
relevant statute of limitations, 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2002) does not
mention discovery. In interpreting a similar statute, the Mucha court determined
that "it must remain a matter of speculation whether an Illinois court would
apply [the discovery rule]." Id. at 612. Mucha did note that "the tide in Illinois
is running strongly in favor in favor of the discovery rule," and suggested that
Illinois may apply a discovery rule similar to the rule in O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416
A.2d 862, 872-873 (N.J. 1980). Id. at 611-12. 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2002)
states that "actions ... to recover the possession of personal property ... shall
be commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued." Recent
Illinois case law shows that the Mucha speculation may have been prophetic. In
Hitt v. Stephens, the Fourth District Appellate Court held that "the discovery
rule applies in replevin actions." Hitt v. Stephens, 675 N.E.2d 275, 278 (4th
Dist. 1996). Significantly, the Hitt court discusses its holding in demand and
refusal language, suggesting that a replevin discovery rule would not contain a
due diligence component; in the court's estimation only notice to the owner
from the possessor would end the tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. at 275.
Such a rule would vary from the O 'Keefe rule, and would be closer to the New
York rule from Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
However, the Hitt holding is tempered by the general Illinois rule that the
discovery rule is "applied on a case-by-case analysis, balancing 'the increase in
difficulty of proof which accompanies the passage of time against the hardship
to the plaintiff who neither knows nor should have known of the existence of the
right to sue."' Hitt, 675 N.E.2d, at 277 (quoting Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors
Adjustment Co., 651 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (1995). The Hitt holding would only
be persuasive authority on a Cook County, Illinois, circuit court (where
presumably the claim would be brought). In absence of any controlling
authority on the specific issue of replevin in the art context, Illinois may borrow
the Seventh Circuit's analysis of analogous Indiana law in Autocephalous, 917
F.2d 278, 288-290 (7th Cir. 1990), wherein the court determined that Indiana
would apply a discovery rule with a due diligence component to determine
when the statute of limitations began to run on the plaintiff's action for replevin
of the Kanakaria mosaic looted from Cyprus in the late 1970s.
171. See supra text accompanying note 130.
172. See supra text accompanying note 129. See also International Harvester
v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (applying the
governmental interest analysis to choice of law in tort).
30
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss1/3
RECENT LITIGATION A TTEMPTS
lead a California court to apply its own statute of limitations,' and
it is fairly clear that an Illinois court would apply its own statute of
limitations under a significant contacts analysis.'74 In either
jurisdiction, no matter what law was applied, laches would not be a
problem. In both California and Illinois, replevin is an action at
law, and laches is not a defense to an action at law.'75 Obviously,
there are advantages to Bennigson if the case remains in
California. The statute of limitations issue is clear,'76 and the only
real issues there would be determination of ownership 77 and
possibly the discovery issue.'
173. A primary consideration in choice of law issues for California is the
ability of California residents to recover in tort; Bennigson's ability to recover
would be much more unsettled if Illinois law were applied. See International
Harvester, 157 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
174. Illinois employs the most-significant-contacts approach to choice of law
in tort, choosing "the local law of the place of injury unless Illinois has a more
significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties." Wreglesworth
v. Artco, Inc., 738 N.E.2d 964, 971 (1st Dist. 2000). "Illinois courts would
apply their own statute of limitations, as a general rule, to cases of this sort."
Kalmich v. Bruno, 450 F. Supp. 227, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (case involving
confiscation of property by the Nazis). It is worthy to note here that, if French
law conveyed good title to Alsdorf, or if the corresponding French law limiting
actions time-bars Bennigson's claim, see Warin, No. 115143/99, 2001 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 542, at *20-21, Illinois would not even entertain the action. See
735 ILCS 5/13-2 10 (West 2002) "When a cause of action has arisen in a state or
territory out of this State, or in a foreign country, and, by the laws thereof, an
action cannot be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon
shall not be maintained in this State."
175. In California, laches is not a defense to replevin. See supra text
accompanying note 131; Fredrichs v. Tracy, 33 P. 750 (1893) (replevin is an
action at law). In Illinois, laches is not a defense to replevin. See Hitt, 675
N.E.2d 275 (citing General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Vaughn, 193 N.E.2d
483, 486) "Since replevin is a legal, not an equitable action, laches would not
apply."
176. See supra text accompanying notes 130, 169.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
178. See supra text accompanying note 130. As with Altmann, it is unsettled
as to whether or not a due diligence component would be imposed on Bennigson
in accordance with the discovery rule. Bennigson cited both Autocephalous,
917 F.2d 278, 288-290 (7th Cir. 1990), and O'Keefe, 416 A.2d 862, (N.J. 1980),
20041
31
Wissbroecker: Six Klimts, a Picasso, & a Schiele: Recent Litigation Attempts to
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART & ENT. LA W
VII. CONCLUSION
There are a number of avenues currently available for claimants
to recover Nazi-looted artwork that did not exist in the first 50
years following World War II. In addition to litigation, which is
the focus of this paper, a number of museums and nations have
willingly opened their collections and archives to scrutiny by
potential claimants." 9 As a result, an extraordinarily large number
of works have been returned. 8 ' The return of these works has
been achieved, for the most part, through cordial negotiations or
seemingly fair administrative processes.1 However, as this paper
has demonstrated, the return of Nazi-looted artworks is not yet a
fait accompli. When the economic stakes are high, the process
becomes adversarial. And, when placed under the legal
microscope, problems of proof and conflicting principles of
in relation to his analysis of the replevin issue. Application for T.R.O,
Bennigson, No. BC287294 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002). It is significant that both of
these cases impose a due diligence component to the discovery rule, and if the
court were to incorporate a due diligence component into either CAL. CODE CIV.
P. § 338 or CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 354.3, Bennigson might have difficulty
explaining his objective efforts to discover the painting's location. See
California Pioneers, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873. Bennigson's attorney alleges that
the Picasso was not viewed publicly while in Alsdorf s possession until it was
sent to the Tunkl Gallery in the Fall of 2001. E-mail from E. Randol
Schoenberg, attorney for Bennigson (April 24, 2003, 16:24:03 CST) (on file
with author). However, Alsdorf alleged that "the Picasso had been viewed as
her residence by a number of individuals and institutions." Bennigson, No.
BC287294 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002).
179. See, e.g., the Metropolitan Museum of Art, at http://metmuseum.org;
The Art Institute of Chicago at http://artic.edu; the Cleveland Museum of Art at
http://clevelandart.org; the Museum of Modem Art at http://moma.org; the
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, at http://mfa.org; the National Gallery of Art at
http://nga.org; the British museums' website at www.nationalmuseums.org; the
German government's website at www.lost.art.de; and the Russian
government's website at www.lostart.ru and www.restitution.ru.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 76, 95. See also Sophia
Kishkovsky, A New Glasnost On War's Looted Art, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, at
El (detailing Russian and German efforts to return Nazi-looted art).
181. Id.
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international law create a complex litigation environment that can
get very expensive, very quickly. In this scenario, only claimants
with some level of personal wealth and claims to paintings of
considerable value will likely take the litigation route. For these
claimants, however, it is encouraging to note that all three
branches of the United States government have been willing to
expend resources, 82 effect legislative change," 3 and stretch the
limits of legal interpretation' 84 to create an environment that
provides substantially greater opportunities to recover the works of
art taken from their families during Nazi occupation.
In final analysis, the results of efforts to recover Nazi-looted
artwork, either through litigation or less adversarial avenues,
transcend secondary concerns of simply restoring valuable works
of art to family coffers. The battles of Jaray, Altmann, Bennigson,
as well as others, highlight a theme of central importance to
civilized society; that the cultural heritage of a people is not
something subject to erasure by callous disregard, or even by brute
force. By clinging to the notion that what was taken by the Nazis
should be returned, no matter what the cost or the course of
intervening events, entire nations have been persuaded to join the
battle to restore that stolen cultural heritage. And perhaps, as
artifacts and artworks looted from Iraq during the recent conflict
begin to make their way into the world marketplace, the
framework is in place to restore those works to their rightful
owners without the difficulty faced by victims of Nazi looting
during World War II.
182. See Wally II, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 72, 130.
184. See Wally III, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445; Altmann II, 317 F.3d 954.
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